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Abstract	
A	number	of	highly	cited	papers	by	Flyvbjerg	and	associates	have	shown	that	ex	
ante	 infrastructure	 appraisals	 tend	 to	 be	 overly	 optimistic.	 Ex	 post	 evaluations	
indicate	a	bias	where	investment	costs	are	higher	and	benefits	lower	on	average	
than	predicted	ex	ante.	These	authors	argue	that	 the	bias	must	be	attributed	to	
intentional	misrepresentation	by	project	developers.	This	paper	 shows	 that	 the	
bias	may	arise	 simply	as	a	 selection	bias,	without	 there	being	any	bias	at	 all	 in	
predictions	 ex	 ante,	 and	 that	 such	 a	 bias	 is	 bound	 to	 arise	 whenever	 ex	 ante	
predictions	are	related	 to	 the	decisions	whether	 to	 implement	projects.	Using	a	
database	of	projects	we	present	examples	indicating	that	the	selection	bias	may	
be	 substantial.	 The	 examples	 also	 indicate	 that	 benefit‐cost	 ratios	 remains	 a	
useful	 selection	 criterion	 even	 when	 cost	 and	 benefits	 are	 highly	 uncertain,	
gainsaying	 the	 argument	 that	 such	 uncertainties	 render	 cost‐benefit	 analyses	
useless.		
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A	 large	 body	 of	 evidence	 shows	 that	 transport	 investments	 are	 often	 subject	 to	 cost	
overruns,	 and	 that	 costs	 have	 been	 underestimated	 on	 average	 (see	 e.g.	 van	 Wee	
(2007);	 a	 summary	 of	 	 several	 studies	 can	 be	 found	 in	 (Lundberg,	 Jenpanitsub,	 &	
Pyddoke,	 2011)).	 This	 bias	 has	 been	 taken	 as	 a	 sign	 that	 cost	 overruns	 cannot	 be	
caused	 simply	 by	 “honest	 errors”	 in	 the	 ex‐ante	 cost	 estimates.	 In	 particular,	 Bent	
Flyvbjerg	and	his	associates	have	published	a	series	of	much	cited	papers	 (Flyvbjerg,	
2008,	 2009;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Holm,	 &	 Buhl,	 2002;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Skamris	 Holm,	 &	 Buhl,	 2004,	
2005)	 that	 indicate	a	persistent	bias	 in	 infrastructure	project	appraisals,	where	 costs	
are	systematically	underestimated	and	benefits	are	systematically	overestimated.	They	
argue	that	the	bias	must	be	due	to	systematic	misrepresentation	by	project	promoters,	
and	 they	 use	 words	 such	 as	 deception	 and	 lie	 to	 describe	 what	 is	 going	 on.	 This	 is	
clearly	a	very	serious	critique.	Random	errors	are	explicitly	rejected	as	an	explanation	
for	the	observed	forecast	bias.	In	the	words	of	Flyvbjerg	(2009):	“If	misleading	forecasts	
were	truly	caused	by	technical	inadequacies,	simple	mistakes,	and	inherent	problems	with	
predicting	 the	 future,	we	would	 expect	 a	 less	 biased	 distribution	 of	 errors	 in	 forecasts	
around	zero.”	No	supporting	arguments	for	this	claim	are	provided.		
	
This	paper	will	 show,	however,	 that	such	a	bias	can	occur	as	a	result	of	 the	selection	
process,	without	there	being	any	bias	at	all	in	the	forecasts	ex	ante.	All	it	takes	for	bias	
to	occur	is	that	the	selection	of	projects	is	related	to	ex	ante	predictions.	Thus	we	show	
the	Flyvbjerg	argument	to	be	invalid:	It	is	perfectly	possible	that	forecasts	are	actually	
unbiased,	but	that	selection	of	the	best	projects,	influenced	by	the	same	forecasts,	leads	
to	bias.	It	follows	that	it	is	not	possible	to	conclude	from	the	observation	of	ex	post	bias	
that	that	bias	must	be	deliberate.	Note	that	we	do	not	claim	that	deliberate	deception	
does	not	occur	–	in	fact,	there	is	substantial	evidence	that	it	does.	Our	point	is	that	any	
selection	 process	 that	 is	 affected	 by	 predicted	 costs	 or	 benefits	 will	 yield	 biased	
outcomes.	 Hence,	 selection	 is	 a	 very	 plausible	 cause	 of	 observed	 biases	 in	 costs	 or	
benefits.	Whether	 it	 is	 the	only	cause	of	biases	 in	a	given	context	 is	 impossible	 to	say	
without	further	evidence.		
	
That	selection	processes	from	an	unbiased	population	may	yield	biased	outcomes	is	of	
course	 a	 general	 phenomenon.	 In	 the	 auction	 literature,	 a	 similar	 phenomenon	 is	
termed	winner’s	curse	(Thaler,	1988).	The	name	comes	from	sealed‐bid,	common‐value	
auctions,	where	a	number	of	bidders	bid	for	an	item	of	uncertain	value,	a	value	which	is	
the	same	for	all	bidders.	All	bidders	guess	the	true	value	of	the	item,	place	sealed	bids	
according	to	these	guesses,	and	the	highest	bidder	gets	to	purchase	the	item.	It	is	clear	
that,	on	average,	the	result	will	be	that	the	winner	ends	up	paying	more	than	the	value	
of	the	item	–	hence	the	name	“winner’s	curse”.		In	econometrics	the	same	phenomenon	
is	called	selection	bias	(Heckman,	1979)	and	its	presence	means	that	the	independent	
variables	are	rendered	not	independent	of	noise	terms;	this	violates	the	basic	statistical	
assumptions	that	are	commonly	made	and	more	involved	methods	have	to	be	used.	A	
process	 similar	 to	 selection	may	 also	 explain	 the	 apparent	 overconfidence	 exhibited	
when	a	majority	of	people	rank	themselves	as	better	 than	average	on	easy	tasks	(e.g.	
driving)	and	worse	than	average	on	difficult	 tasks;	 for	example,	people	who	have	not	
been	involved	in	road	accidents	may	rationally	rate	themselves	as	better	than	average	
drivers,	 this	would	not	be	overconfidence	(Benoît	&	Dubra,	2011).	 “Regression	to	 the	
mean”	 is	 a	 well‐known	 statistical	 trap	 caused	 by	 selection:	 if	 participants	 in	 some	
experiment	 are	 selected	 based	 on	 some	 characteristic	 with	 random	 variation	 –	 say,	
having	a	high	result	on	a	test	–	then	follow‐up	measurements	of	that	characteristic	(a	
repeated	 test,	 say)	 will	 show	 that	 the	 selected	 group	 has	 become	more	 similar	 to	 a	
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control	group	(the	test	difference	will	be	smaller).	This	trap	may	lead	to	false	inferences	
concerning	the	effects	of	some	kind	of	treatment.		
	
Selection	 may	 cause	 systematic	 cost	 overruns	 and	 benefit	 shortfalls	 for	 transport	
investments.	Imagine	a	decision	maker	faced	with	a	number	of	alternative	investments	
with	uncertain	 cost	 estimates	 (ignore	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 benefits	 for	 the	 time	being).	
Based	on	these	estimates,	the	decision	maker	selects	a	number	of	the	projects,	with	less	
costly	projects	being	more	likely	to	be	selected.	Now,	even	if	the	random	errors	of	the	
initial	cost	estimates	have	zero	mean,	 the	expected	mean	error	of	 the	cost	of	selected	
projects	will	be	larger	than	zero.	In	other	words,	the	selected	investments	will	exhibit	
systematic	cost	overruns,	purely	as	a	consequence	of	the	selection	process.					
	
As	this	paper	will	show,	all	that	is	essentially	required	for	selection	bias	to	be	present	in	
project	appraisal	 is	that	there	is	some	kind	of	selection	process	 in	operation	whereby	
selection	is	influenced	by	a	noisy	prediction.	We	describe	the	process	in	a	stylised	way	
in	 a	 model	 that	 comprises	 a	 noisy	 prediction	 step	 and	 a	 noisy	 decision	 step.	 This	
description	 fits	 easily	 with	 selection	 of	 projects	 from	 a	 list	 of	 projects.	 Such	 a	
description	also	 fits	with	projects	 that	 seem	 to	be	of	 a	more	unique	nature.	Consider	
that	 projects	 that	 come	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 public	 have	 generally	 been	 through	 a	
long,	more	or	less	formalised	screening	process.	Initial	estimates	of	costs	and	benefits	
may	have	been	made	at	various	stages	in	the	selection	process	and	numerous	potential	
projects	given	up	in	the	light	of	such	information.	Therefore	the	potential	projects	that	
come	to	our	attention	have	already	been	selected;	they	are	not	random.		
	
It	is	costly	to	appraise	transport	investment	projects.	For	the	largest	projects,	the	traffic	
forecast	 alone	 may	 cost	 several	 hundred	 thousand	 Euros,	 and	 it	 takes	 a	 deliberate	
decision	 to	 incur	 such	 costs.	 Thus	 the	 fact	 that	 estimates	 of	 investment	 costs	 and	
benefits	have	been	prepared	implies	that	some	kind	of	selection	process	will	have	been	
in	 operation.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 observing	 any	 list	 of	 projects	 that	 is	 not	 already	
heavily	selected	under	influence	of	some	preliminary	prediction	of	costs	and	benefits.			
	
Faced	 with	 systematic	 cost	 overruns	 and	 benefit	 shortfalls,	 a	 decision‐maker	 may	
conclude	that	a	stricter	selection	criterion	is	necessary.	For	example,	several	countries	
are	 implementing	 so‐called	 “uplifts”	 in	 their	 procedures	 for	 project	 appraisal	 (as	
suggested	 in	Flyvbjerg,	2008).	However,	we	will	show	that	raising	 the	bar	 for	project	
selection	 will	 increase	 the	 bias.	 If	 the	 same	 uplift	 is	 applied	 to	 all	 projects,	 it	 will	
obviously	not	affect	project	selection,	holding	the	number	of	selected	projects	constant.	
Uplifts	will	only	improve	project	selection	if	projects	can	be	divided	into	classes,	where	
the	bias	of	each	class	is	known	in	advance.	However,	uplifts	may	still	be	useful	even	if	
project	 selection	 is	 unaffected,	 since	 it	 enables	 more	 accurate	 estimates	 of	 the	
aggregate	long‐term	budget	consequences	of	decisions,	if	the	size	of	the	outcome	bias	is	
known	from	experience.		
	
Given	the	large	uncertainties	in	cost	and	benefit	estimates	that	are	observed	ex	post,	it	
may	seem	tempting	to	draw	the	conclusion	that	cost‐benefit	analysis	is	useless	as	a	tool	
for	selecting	which	alternatives	should	be	prioritized.	In	the	words	of	Flyvbjerg	(2009):	
”With	 errors	and	biases	of	 such	magnitude	 in	 the	 forecasts	 that	 form	a	basis	 for	 cost–
benefit	 analyses,	 such	 analyses	will	 also,	with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 certainty,	 be	 strongly	
misleading.	 ‘Garbage	 in,	 garbage	 out’,	 as	 the	 saying	 goes.”	However,	 we	 demonstrate	
under	quite	general	assumptions	that	the	average	selected	project	has	a	higher	payoff	
than	 the	 average	 project,	 even	 if	 forecasts	 are	 uncertain.	 Hence,	 selection	 based	 on	
predicted	 payoffs	 is	 still	 beneficial	 in	 this	 sense,	 even	 with	 uncertain	 forecasts.	
Although	 the	 gain	 in	 average	 payoff	 from	 selection	 may	 vary,	 it	 is	 always	 positive	
regardless	of	how	much	noise	 there	 is	 in	 the	predicted	project	payoff.	 In	a	numerical	
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illustration	 based	 on	 data	 on	 real‐world	 transport	 investments,	 we	 find	 that	 the	
benefit‐cost	 ratio	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 a	 robust	 selection	 criterion	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	
average	 benefit‐cost	 ratio	 of	 the	 selected	 projects	 greatly	 outperforms	 random	
selection	 even	 for	 large	 uncertainties	 in	 benefit	 and	 cost	 estimates.	 Hence,	 the	 claim	
that	“cost–benefit	analyses	[…]	will	be	strongly	misleading”	is	unfounded.			
	
This	 paper	 begins	 in	 section	 2	 by	 formulating	 a	 stylised	model	 of	 a	 project	 selection	
procedure.	The	model	incorporates	the	essential	elements	of	such	a	process,	otherwise	
it	imposes	minimal	structure.	This	ensures	that	conclusions	will	be	applicable	under	a	
wide	 range	 of	 circumstances.	 In	 the	model,	 projects	 are	 decided	 based	 on	 predicted	
payoff	that	is	related	to	actual	payoff.	The	actual	payoff	is	observed	only	after	projects	
have	been	selected	and	only	for	those	projects	that	were	selected.	There	is	a	selection	
mechanism	that	 selects	projects	with	a	probability	 that	 increases	as	a	 function	of	 the	
predicted	payoff.	The	model	assumes	that	ex	ante	predictions	are	unbiased.	In	spite	of	
this,	 the	 model	 shows	 that	 the	 forecast	 error	 will	 be	 positive	 on	 average	 for	 those	
projects	 that	were	 selected	 and	a	bias	will	 seem	 to	 exist.	 Strengthening	 the	 selection	
criterion	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 bias	 will	 actually	 increase	 the	 bias.	 The	 selected	
projects	will	have	a	higher	average	actual	payoff	than	unselected	projects.	
	
Section	3	 illustrates	 the	 empirical	 relevance	 of	 the	 selection	 bias	 using	 a	 database	 of	
projects.	The	 list	 consists	of	 the	461	 road	and	 rail	 investments	of	 all	 types	and	sizes,	
that	competed	for	inclusion	in	the	Swedish	transport	investment	plan	2010‐2021.	We	
show	that	plausible	uncertainties	in	ex	ante	estimates	of	costs	and	benefits	can	give	rise	
to	large	bias	for	selected	projects.	If	the	selection	process	is	more	competitive,	i.e.	more	
projects	are	rejected,	average	cost	overruns	and	benefit	shortfalls	increase.	Moreover,	
the	 examples	 indicate	 that	 the	 average	 benefit‐cost	 ratio	 of	 the	 selected	 projects	
decreases	only	slowly	as	 the	noise	 in	benefit	and	cost	estimates	 increases.	Hence,	 the	
benefit‐cost	ratio	seems	to	be	a	useful	selection	criterion	even	when	ex‐ante	estimates	
are	highly	uncertain.		
2 A  MATHEMATICAL  MODEL  OF  FORECAST  BIAS  AS 
SELECTION BIAS 
Projects	 are	 drawn	 from	 a	 population	 of	 projects.	 A	 project	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	
random	 variable	 X	 that	 represents	 the	 payoff	 of	 the	 project.	 It	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	
specify	 which	 payoff	 measure	 we	 are	 talking	 about.	 All	 that	 matters	 is	 that	 it	 is	 a	
measure	that	influences	the	decision	whether	to	carry	out	the	project.	
	
The	 project	 payoff	 is	 not	 observed	 initially.	 It	 can	 only	 be	 observed	 if	 the	 project	 is	
carried	out.	At	the	time	a	project	is	decided,	one	observes	instead	the	random	variable	
Y	 that	 depends	 on	 ܺ	 and	 represents	 a	 prediction	 of	 X.	 The	 relationship	 between	
predicted	 and	 actual	 payoff	 can	 be	 specified	 in	 a	 very	 general	 way	 by	 letting	 ܻ ൌ
݂ሺܺ, ߝሻ,	where	 ߝ	 is	 a	 noise	 term	 that	 is	 independent	 of	X	 and	 i.i.d.	 over	 projects,	 and	
where	݂	is	strictly	increasing	in	ߝ.	
 
The	 forecast	error	 is	ܻ െ ܺ	and	we	assume	that	 forecasts	are	unbiased,	which	means	
that	the	forecast	payoff	 is	equal	to	the	actual	payoff	on	average:	ܧሺܻ െ ܺሻ ൌ 0.	This	is	
weaker	 than	 assuming	 that	 ܧሺܻ|ܺሻ ൌ ܺ,	 which	 would	 mean	 that	 a	 regression	 of	
forecast	payoff	against	actual	payoff	(if	the	latter	could	be	observed)	would	yield	the	45	
degree	line.		
	
Optimism	bias	in	project	appraisal:	deception	or	selection?	
	
5	
	
The	decision	whether	to	carry	out	a	project	is	based	on	whether	the	predicted	payoff	Y	
exceeds	a	given	threshold	c,	but	it	is	not	a	deterministic	process.	The	model	allows	for	
idiosyncratic	 factors	 in	the	decision	process	by	saying	that	a	project	 is	selected	 if	and	
only	 if	 ܼ ≡ ݃ሺܻ െ ܿ, ߜሻ ൒ 0,	where	 	 is	 a	 random	 term	 that	 is	 i.i.d.	 over	 projects	 and	
independent	of	X	and	.	The	 function	g	 is	assumed	to	be	strictly	 increasing	 in	 its	 first	
argument,	so	increasing	the	value	of	c	decreases	the	probability	that	a	project	is	carried	
out.	All	 random	variables	are	assumed	to	have	densities.	For	analytical	simplicity,	we	
assume	that	errors	are	supported	on	the	whole	real	line	and	that	݂	is	such	that	for	any	
number	c	and	given	X,	ܲሺܻ ൒ ܿ|ܺሻ ൐ 0.	
	
The	intuition	behind	our	main	results	is	simple,	and	is	illustrated	in	Figure	1.	Black	dots	
are	the	true,	unobserved	payoffs	of	number	of	project	suggestions	–	for	the	purpose	of	
illustration,	we	assume	 that	 the	 true	payoffs	 are	 the	 same	 for	 all	 projects.	A	decision	
maker	observes	 forecast	 payoffs,	 illustrated	by	 circles,	 and	only	projects	 above	 some	
selection	threshold	are	realized.	The	true	payoffs	are	revealed	once	projects	have	been	
realized.	It	is	obvious	that	the	true	payoffs	will	on	average	be	lower	than	forecasted	for	
the	 selected	 projects,	 even	 if	 forecasts	were	unbiased	 for	all	 projects.	 In	other	words,	
the	 selection	 process	will	mean	 that	 the	 decision	maker	will	 be	 disappointed	 by	 the	
true	 payoffs	 of	 the	 selected	 projects,	 on	 average	 –	 even	 if	 the	 forecast	 errors	 for	 all	
projects	were	zero	on	average;	but	the	decision	maker	will	never	learn	the	true	payoffs	
of	the	non‐realized	projects.			
	
	
Figure 1. The selection bias mechanism. Black dots are  true payoffs, circles are  forecasted payoffs. 
Only projects above the selection threshold are realized.  
	
It	 is	 also	obvious	 that	 the	more	 competitive	 the	 selection	process	 is	 –	 the	higher	 the	
selection	threshold	is	–	the	larger	will	be	the	average	difference	between	the	estimated	
payoffs	and	the	true	ones.	
	
This	simple	idea	is	formalized	and	made	more	general	below.	True	payoffs	do	not	have	
to	be	equal	for	the	same	phenomenon	to	occur,	and	the	selection	process	does	not	have	
to	be	 a	 strict	 payoff	 threshold:	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 selection	probability	 is	 to	 some	 extent	
affected	by	the	forecasted	payoff,	a	bias	will	result.		
2.1 Analysis 
We	now	look	only	at	projects	that	have	been	carried	out.	For	these	projects	we	observe	
both	the	predicted	payoff	Y	and	the	actual	payoff	X.	Thus,	we	observe	draws	from	the	
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distribution	of	forecast	errors	conditional	on	selection.	The	probability	that	the	forecast	
error	is	smaller	than	some	number	t,	conditional	on	selection	is	denoted		
	
ܲሺܻ െ ܺ ൑ ݐ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ.	
	
Throughout	we	consider	only	situations	where	selection	makes	a	difference,	i.e.	where	
0 ൏ ܲሺܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൏ 1.	The	following	proposition	states	that	the	prediction	error	is	positive	
on	 average	 for	 projects	 that	 are	 carried	 out.	 Hence	 it	will	 seem	 as	 if	 predictions	 are	
biased	even	though	they	actually	are	unbiased	ex	ante.	But	the	selection	of	projects	is	
such	that	projects	where	the	prediction	error	is	positive	are	more	likely	to	be	carried	
out,	everything	else	equal,	and	this	effect	produces	the	bias.	
	
Proposition	 1.	 Payoffs	 are	 systematically	 overestimated	 for	 the	 realised	 projects:	
ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൐ 0.	
	
All	proofs	are	given	in	the	Appendix.	The	next	proposition	states	that	the	bias	increases	
if	the	required	payoff	is	increased.	The	intuition	is	the	following.	If	the	required	payoff	
was	very	small,	 then	its	effect	would	be	negligible	and	all	projects	would	have	almost	
the	same	probability	of	being	carried	out.	 In	this	case,	 there	would	be	no	bias.	As	the	
required	payoff	increases,	the	selection	process	becomes	more	important	and	it	is	that	
which	causes	bias.	
	
Proposition	2.	A	larger	cutoff	ܿ	implies	a	larger	bias.	
	
It	is	of	interest	to	seek	testable	implications	of	the	model	and	it	is	particularly	useful	if	
such	 implications	 can	 be	 tested	 using	 a	 sample	 consisting	 only	 of	 projects	 that	 have	
been	carried	out.	The	next	proposition	states	that	the	bias	must	decrease	as	a	function	
of	actual	payoff,	if	the	predicted	payoff	depends	additively	on	actual	payoff	and	noise.1	
This	relationship	can	be	tested	in	a	regression	of	bias	against	actual	payoff	of	selected	
projects.	
	
Proposition	3.	If	forecast	error	is	additive	݂ሺܺ, ߝሻ ൌ ܺ ൅ ߝ,	then	the	bias	is	decreasing	as	
a	function	of	real	payoff:	 డడ௫ ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൏ 0.		
When	 payoffs	 of	 selected	 projects	 are	 overestimated	 on	 average	 and	 raising	 the	
threshold	 for	 selection	 only	makes	 the	 bias	worse,	 it	may	 be	 natural	 to	 ask	whether	
selection	 actually	 does	 any	 good.	 The	 final	 proposition	 affirms,	 unsurprisingly,	 that	
selected	 projects	 do	 indeed	 have	 higher	 average	 payoffs	 than	 the	 average	 project,	
provided	that	the	prediction	ܻ	is	an	increasing	function	of	the	actual	payoff	ܺ.	This	is	a	
natural	requirement	to	impose;	it	is	introduced	at	this	stage	only	because	there	was	no	
need	for	it	before.	
	
Proposition	 4.	 If	 ܻ ൌ ݂ሺܺ, ߝሻ	 is	 strictly	 increasing	 as	 a	 function	 of	ܺ,	 then	 a	 selected	
project	yields	higher	payoff	on	average	than	a	random	project:		ܧሺܺሻ ൑ ܧሺܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ.	The	
gain	from	selection	increases	as	the	threshold	is	raised:	 డడ௖ ܧሺܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൒ 0.	
3 SIMULATION RESULTS 
																																																													
1 Given appropriate sign restrictions, additivity can be achieved from a multiplicative model using a 
log‐transformation. 
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We	 have	 shown	 above	 that	 predicted	 payoffs	 will	 be	 biased	 as	 soon	 as	 projects	 are	
selected	from	an	underlying	pool	of	candidate	projects,	and	that	this	bias	will	be	larger	
the	stricter	the	selection	criterion	is.	How	large	the	bias	will	be	depends,	however,	on	
the	 noisiness	 of	 forecasts	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 actual	 payoffs.	 We	 are	 not	 able	 to	
directly	observe	these	quantities	since	we	do	not	have	available	a	database	of	forecasts	
and	outcomes	for	both	selected	and	unselected	projects.	What	we	can	do	to	support	our	
story	 is	 to	 use	 numerical	 examples	 to	 investigate	 the	 selection	 mechanism	 with	
plausible	 noise	 levels	 and	 an	 actual	 real‐world	 distribution	 of	 payoffs.	 We	 will	 also	
explore	 the	usefulness	of	CBA	as	a	selection	tool	when	cost	and	benefit	estimates	are	
uncertain,	by	investigating	how	the	average	benefit‐cost	ratio	of	the	selected	projects	is	
affected	by	forecast	uncertainty.		
	
The	 numerical	 examples	 are	 based	 on	 all	 461	 suggested	 transport	 investments,	
shortlisted	for	possible	inclusion	in	the	Swedish	Transport	Investment	Plan	2010‐2021.	
The	 investments	 are	 described	 in	 Eliasson	 and	 Lundberg	 (2012).	 Each	 suggested	
investment	has	a	total	benefit	B	and	an	investment	cost	C	and	hence	a	benefit‐cost	ratio	
BCR=B/C.	 In	 the	 simulations,	 we	 will	 take	 these	 to	 be	 the	 true	 benefits	 and	 costs,	
unobserved	by	the	analyst	when	selecting	projects.	The	analyst	only	observes	predicted	
benefits	and	costs	B’	and	C’,	where	ܤ′ ൌ ܤ ∗ ߝ஻	and	ܥ′ ൌ ܥ ∗ ߝ஼	and	ߝ஻, ߝ஼	are	random	numbers	generated	in	our	simulation.	The	analyst	is	assumed	to	select	the	100	projects	
with	 the	 highest	 estimated	 benefit‐cost	 ratios2,	 emulating	 project	 selection	 under	 a	
given	budget	constraint.3		
	
We	will	follow	the	convention	that	the	relative	demand	error	is	defined	as	஻ᇲ஻ െ 1	while	
the	relative	cost	error	is	defined	as	 ஼஼ᇲ െ 1.	Note	that	the	relative	cost	error	is	defined	as	the	outcome	divided	by	 the	prediction,	while	 the	 relative	benefit	 error	 is	defined	 the	
other	way	around.	This	 is	consistent	with	much	of	the	literature,	and	will	ensure	that	
estimates	 of	 benefits,	 costs	 and	 benefit‐cost	 ratios	 are	 all	 unbiased.	We	 assume	 that	
benefits	 are	 normally	 distributed	 while	 costs	 are	 lognormally	 distributed.	 With	
ߝ஻~ܰሺ1, ߪ஻ሻ	and	ln	ሺߝ஼ሻ~ܰሺఙ಴
మ
ଶ , ߪ஼ሻ,	we	thus	have	ܧ ቀ
஻ᇲ
஻ െ 1ቁ ൌ 0,		ܧ ቀ
஼
஼ᇲ െ 1ቁ ൌ 0	and,	in	
particular,	 that	 the	 forecast	 of	 the	benefit‐cost	 ratio	 is	 unbiased:	ܧሺܤܥܴᇱሻ ≡ ܧ ቀ஻ᇲ஼ᇲቁ ൌ஻
஼ ≡ ܤܥܴ.	 Figure	 2	 illustrates	 true	 benefit‐cost	 ratios	 BCR	 (black)	 plotted	 against	
predicted	benefit‐cost	ratios	BCR’	(red),	simulated	for	B	=	C	=	0.2.	
																																																													
2 This is of course a simplification of the real decision process. As stated in the previous section, it is 
not necessary that selection is decided on perceived payoff (such as costs and benefits) alone – it is 
enough that the perceived payoffs affect project selection to some extent, such that projects with 
higher perceived payoffs are more likely to be selected.  
3 This selection process is equivalent to the one used in propositions 1 and 2, where all projects with 
payoff  above  a  threshold  were  selected.  This  alternative  selection  process  makes  it  easier  to 
compare outcomes for different error variances, and also to vary the number of candidate projects. 
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Figure 2. Simulated benefit‐cost ratio estimates of the suggested investments (red) and true benefit‐
cost ratios (black), simulated for B = C = 0.2.  
3.1 Cost overruns and benefit shortfalls 
The	first	set	of	simulations	illustrates	how	the	selection	increases	with	increasing	noise	
in	 the	 predictions.	 For	 each	 simulation,	B	 and	C	 are	 fixed,	 and	 errors	 B	 and	 C	 are	
drawn	 for	each	candidate	project.	This	gives	B’,	C’	 and	BCR’	 for	each	project,	 and	 the	
100	“best”	projects	(based	on	BCR’)	are	selected.	B	and	C	are	varied	between	0	and	
0.5	with	a	step	of	0.01,	repeating	each	step	20	times.	Figure	2	shows	how	the	relative	
cost	and	benefit	errors	of	 the	selected	alternatives	grow	as	 the	standard	deviation	of	
the	 costs	 and	 benefits	 grows.	 Each	 dot	 represents	 one	 simulated	 selection,	 with	 the	
simulated	standard	deviation	on	the	x‐axis	and	the	mean	error	of	the	selection	on	the	y‐
axis.	Note	that	the	mean	error	of	the	selected	projects	is	always	positive,	as	predicted	
by	proposition	1.		
	
Figure 3. Mean relative cost error (left) and benefit error (right) of the 100 selected projects, plotted 
against the standard deviation of the estimated costs and benefits of all projects.  
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In	 this	 example,	 the	 relative	errors	 are	approximately	proportional	 to	 the	underlying	
standard	 deviations.	 An	 underlying	 standard	 deviation	 of	 0.3	 results	 in	 an	 average	
overestimation	of	costs	and	benefits	of	approximately	15%;	if	the	underlying	standard	
deviation	is	0.5,	the	overestimation	increases	to	around	30%.	
	
The	size	of	the	resulting	bias	does	not	only	depend	on	the	uncertainties	in	the	cost	and	
benefit	estimates;	it	also	depends	on	how	competitive	the	selection	process	is,	and	how	
much	the	true	benefits	and	costs	vary	across	projects.	First,	as	shown	in	proposition	2,	
the	bias	increases	the	more	competitive	the	selection	process	is:	the	smaller	the	share	
of	selected	projects	is,	the	larger	the	resulting	selection	bias	will	be.	This	is	illustrated	
in	Figure	4.	
	 	
Figure 4. Relative errors  in costs  (left) and benefits  (right) of selected projects as a  function of  the 
fraction of projects that are selected.  
	
In	the	simulations	shown	in	Figure	4,	the	pool	of	candidate	projects	has	been	enlarged	
by	adding	it	to	itself	(from	461	to	4610	alternatives),	and	a	varying	fraction	is	selected	
from	 this	 list	 of	 candidate	 projects.	 The	 resulting	 biases	 in	 benefits	 and	 costs	 are	
plotted	on	the	y‐axis	against	the	fraction	of	projects	that	are	selected	on	the	x‐axis.	20	
simulation	 runs	 are	 made	 for	 each	 fraction,	 using	 B	 =	 C	 =	 0.4.	 When	 10%	 of	 the	
project	suggestions	are	selected,	the	costs	of	the	selected	projects	are	underestimated	
by	almost	40%,	while	benefits	are	overestimated	by	almost	30%.	For	 lower	selection	
fractions,	the	selection	biases	increase	rapidly.		
	
The	 second	 factor	 affecting	 the	 resulting	 bias	 is	 how	 much	 the	 true	 payoffs	 vary	
compared	to	the	noise	in	the	forecasts.	Intuitively,	if	the	best	projects	are	much	better	
than	the	average	ones,	the	best	projects	will	be	selected	even	if	forecasts	are	noisy,	and	
hence	 the	bias	will	 be	 smaller.	 This	 is	 illustrated	 in	Figure	5.	Here,	 true	 benefits	 and	
costs	B	and	C	are	replaced	in	the	simulation	by	B	=	B	and	C	=	C.	The	resulting	bias	in	
benefits	and	costs	is	plotted	on	the	y‐axis	against		on	the	x‐axis.	The	simulations	are	
based	on	B	=	C	=	0.4.	As	expected,	 the	bias	 increases	 the	more	similar	benefits	and	
costs	of	underlying	projects	are,	i.e.		tends	to	zero.		
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Figure 5. Mean cost (left) and benefit (right) errors of selected projects as a function of how similar 
benefits and costs of underlying projects are.  
	
Lundberg	et	al.	(2011)	summarise	the	findings	of	21	studies	of	cost	overruns.	Average	
cost	overruns	in	these	studies	range	from	0%	to	50%.	The	simulations	presented	here	
indicate	 that	 plausible	 values	 of	 benefit	 and	 cost	 uncertainties,	 number	 of	 candidate	
projects	 and	 benefit	 and	 cost	 differences	 between	 candidate	 projects	 can	 easily	 give	
rise	 to	 bias	 of	 this	 magnitude.	 Obviously,	 this	 does	 not	 prove	 that	 intentional	
misrepresentation	does	not	occur;	but	 it	 shows	 that	 the	observed	magnitudes	of	 cost	
overruns	and	benefit	shortfalls	do	not	prove	that	it	does.		
3.2 CBA as selection criterion when costs and benefits are uncertain 
When	uncertainties	in	cost	and	benefit	estimates	are	large,	using	benefit‐cost	ratios	as	
the	 selection	 criterion	 may	 seem	 dubious.	 Proposition	 4	 states	 that	 choosing	 the	
projects	with	 the	 highest	 estimated	 BCR	will	 still	 yield	 a	 better	 outcome	 on	 average	
than	choosing	projects	at	random.	The	size	of	the	gain,	however,	is	an	empirical	matter.	
In	this	section,	we	explore	how	the	average	BCR	of	the	selected	projects	is	affected	by	
the	uncertainties	in	the	cost	and	benefit	estimates.		
	
Figure	5	shows	 the	mean	BCR	of	 the	selected	 investments	 (left),	and	 the	share	of	 the	
100	selected	investments	that	in	fact	belong	to	the	actual	top	100	(right),	i.e.	the	share	
of	“correctly	selected”	projects.			
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Figure  6. Mean  BCR  of  selected  projects  (left)  and  percent  correctly  selected  projects  (right)  as  a 
function of  the  relative BCR  error. Red  lines: mean BCR of all projects  (left) and percent  correctly 
selected projects (right) under random selection.  
	
In	this	example,	the	mean	BCR	of	the	selected	investments	remains	much	higher	than	
the	 average	 BCR	 of	 all	 investments,	 despite	 considerable	 noise	 in	 the	 predictions	 of	
costs	and	benefits.	Moreover,	the	share	of	the	actual	best	projects	that	are	included	in	
the	selection	remains	high,	despite	the	errors	in	the	cost	and	benefit	estimates.		
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This	 paper	 has	 considered	 a	 process	 whereby	 selection	 of	 projects	 is	 influenced	 by	
some	noisy	but	unbiased	prediction	of	a	payoff.	Under	very	general	circumstances,	such	
a	process	will	lead	to	selection	bias,	i.e.	that	the	predicted	payoff	is	smaller	on	average	
than	 the	 payoff	 observed	 ex	 post.	 The	 selection	 bias	 can	 easily	 be	 large	 at	 plausible	
noise	levels.		
	
It	is	important	to	realise	that	the	results	of	this	paper	do	not	require	that	decisions	are	
determined	 by	 predicted	 payoffs,	 only	 that	 noisy	 predictions	 have	 some	 influence	 on	
decisions.	Still,	it	might	be	argued	that	cost	overruns	and	benefit	shortfalls	are	unlikely	
to	be	a	result	of	 selection	bias	because	predictions	of	costs	and	benefits	do	not	affect	
decisions.	While	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 benefits	 and	 costs	 do	 affect	 project	 selection	
(Eliasson	 &	 Lundberg,	 2012;	 Nellthorp	 &	Mackie,	 2000;	 Odeck,	 2010),	 other	 studies	
have	 found	 limited	 or	 no	 evidence	 of	 benefit‐cost	 ratios	 affecting	 project	 selection	
(Nilsson,	1991;	Odeck,	1996).	However,	it	seems	safe	to	say	that	predicted	costs	alone	
virtually	always	affect	project	selection,	simply	because	resources	are	generally	scarce.	
Moreover,	 as	 we	 noted	 in	 the	 introduction,	 there	 are	 in	 general	 very	many	 possible	
projects	that	could	be	considered	but	never	make	it	to	the	point	where	predictions	of	
costs	and	benefits	will	be	made	and	published.	This	early	process	is	likely	to	be	affected	
by	 some	of	 the	 same	 factors	 that	 later	might	 cause	errors	 in	predictions	of	 costs	and	
benefits.	 It	 therefore	 seems	 clear	 that	 there	must	 always	 be	 a	 selection	 process	 that	
leads	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 bias	 that	 has	 been	 observed.	 Our	 simulations	 show	 that	 the	
selection	bias	on	its	own	is	enough	to	generate	the	magnitudes	of	bias	encountered	in	
reality,	for	plausible	values	of	the	relevant	variables	(see	the	survey	in	Lundberg	et	al.,	
2011).		
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Given	 the	 large	 uncertainty	 inherent	 in	 predictions	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits,	 one	 may	
question	 the	 usefulness	 of	 basing	 project	 selection	 on	 these.	 This	 is	 for	 example	 the	
conclusion	 in	Flyvbjerg	 (2009).	But	 as	we	have	 shown,	 this	 argument	does	not	 fly:	 if	
projects	are	selected	based	on	predicted	costs	and	benefits,	even	if	the	predictions	are	
very	uncertain,	then	the	selected	projects	will	turn	out	to	perform	better	on	average	on	
these	criteria	than	random	projects.	In	fact,	in	our	numerical	investigations,	the	benefit‐
cost	 ratio	 is	 a	 surprisingly	 robust	 selection	 criterion	 even	 under	 considerable	
uncertainty,	yielding	much	higher	average	benefit‐cost	ratios	than	random	selection.		
	
One	 of	 the	 suggested	 ways	 to	 remedy	 biased	 predictions	 is	 to	 use	 so‐called	 uplifts,	
whereby	 predicted	 costs	 and	 benefits	 are	 corrected	 by	 the	 expected	 bias	 (Flyvbjerg,	
2008).	If	the	expected	magnitude	of	the	aggregate	bias	is	known	in	advance,	uplifts	can	
be	useful	since	they	enable	more	precise	aggregate	budget	planning.	If	it	is	possible	to	
ascribe	different	uplifts	 to	different	 classes	of	projects,	 using	uplifts	may	 also	 lead	 to	
better	project	selection.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	imposing	a	stricter	selection	
criterion,	 for	 example	 requiring	 a	 higher	 threshold	 benefit‐cost	 ratio,	 will	 in	 fact	
increase	the	resulting	bias	in	outcomes,	contrary	to	the	intention.			
	
Of	course,	the	demonstration	that	selection	leads	to	selection	bias	does	not	rule	out	the	
existence	 of	 bias	 in	 the	 ex	 ante	 evaluation	 of	 investment	 projects.	 We	 have	 merely	
shown	that	it	is	not	possible	to	conclude	from	the	observation	of	ex	post	bias	that	there	
must	have	been	bias	in	the	predictions	ex	ante.	We	have	also	presented	some	numerical	
evidence	 that	 a	 selection	 process	 on	 its	 own	 is	 enough	 to	 generate	 bias	 of	 typical	
magnitudes,	 given	 plausible	 parameters.	 So	 while	 we	 can	 refute	 the	 argument	 of	
Flyvbjerg,	 we	 cannot	 refute	 his	 conclusion.	 Strategic	 misrepresentation	 by	 project	
promoters	may	well	 exist;	 but	 the	 existence	 of	 systematic	 cost	 overruns	 and	 benefit	
shortfalls	 does	 not	 prove	 this.	 As	 long	 as	 projects	 compete	 for	 selection	 based	 on	
uncertain,	 formal	or	 informal,	predictions	of	costs	and	benefits,	 these	phenomena	are	
bound	to	occur.		
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Appendix	
6.1 Proof of propositions 1 and 2 
Consider	 the	 expected	 forecast	 error	 conditional	 on	 selection	 and	 use	 the	 law	 of	
iterated	expectations	to	find	that	
	
ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ		
ൌ ܧሾܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0, ܺ, ߜሻ|ܼ ൒ 0ሿ ൌ		
ൌ ܧሾܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܻ ൒ ܿ ൅ ݃ିଵሺ0|ߜሻ, ܺ, ߜሻ|ܼ ൒ 0ሿ ൌ		
ൌ ܧሾܧሺ݂ሺܺ, ߝሻ െ ܺ|ߝ ൒ ݂⁻¹ሺܿ ൅ ݃⁻¹ሺ0|ߜሻ|ܺሻ, ܺ, ߜሻ|ܼ ൒ 0ሿ,	
	
where	the	second	equality	uses	that	g	is	invertible	in	Y	for	any	δ	and	the	third	equality	
uses	that	f	is	invertible	in	ε	for	any	X.	
	
For	 any	 given	 value	 of	 X	 and	 δ,	 ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ߝ ൒ ݂⁻¹ሺܿ ൅ ݃⁻¹ሺ0|ߜሻ|ܺሻ, ܺ, ߜሻ	 exists	 and	 is	
increasing	 as	 a	 function	 of	 c.	 Hence	 also	 the	 conditional	 expected	 forecast	 error	
ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ	is	increasing	as	a	function	of	c.	This	proves	proposition	2.	
	
Let	 now	 ܿ → െ∞.	 Then	 in	 the	 limit	 all	 projects	 are	 selected	 and	 ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ →
ܧሺܻ െ ܺሻ ൌ 0.	This	shows	that	ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൐ 0	for	any	value	of	c	as	required.	
6.2 Proof of proposition 3 
To	demonstrate	the	inequality,	use	that	
	
ܧሺܻ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0, ߜሻ ൌ 	ݔ ൅ ܧ൫ߝหߝ ൒ ܿ െ ݔ ൅ ݃ିଵሺ0|ߜሻ൯ ൌ ݔ ൅ ׬
ߝ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
׬ ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
.	
	
Then	differentiate	with	respect	to	x	to	find	that	
	
߲
߲ݔ ܧሺܻ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0, ߜሻ ൌ 1 െ
׬ ߝ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
ቀ׬ ߝ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ ቁ
ଶ ݄ሺܿ െ ݔሻ ൅
ሺܿ െ ݔሻ݄ሺܿ െ ݔሻ
׬ ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
	
ൌ 1 െ ׬
൫ߝ െ ܿሺെݔሻ൯݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
׬ ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
݄ሺܿ െ ݔሻ
׬ ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
,	
	
which	is	strictly	smaller	than	1.	Use	last	the	law	of	iterated	expectations	to	find	that	
߲
߲ݔ ܧሺܻ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൌ ܧ ൭
߲
߲ݔ ܧሺܻ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0, ߜሻ൱ ൏ 1.	
	
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4 
Note	that	
	
ܧሺܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൌ ܧ൫ܧሺܺ|ܺ ൒ ݂ିଵሺܿ ൅ ݃ିଵሺ0|ߜሻ|ߝሻ, ߜ, ߝሻ൯ ൒ ܧሺܺሻ.		
	
The	second	statement	of	the	proposition	follows	from	straightforward	differentiation	
of		
Optimism	bias	in	project	appraisal:	deception	or	selection?	
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ܧሺܺ|ܺ ൒ ݇ሻ ൌ ׬ ݔ݂ሺݔሻ݀ݔ
ஶ
௞
׬ ݂ሺݔሻ݀ݔஶ௞
	
	
with	݇ ൌ ݂ିଵሺܿ ൅ ݃ିଵሺ0|ߜሻ|ߝሻ	being	an	increasing	function	of	ܿ.		
		
	
